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James Salzman and J.B. Ruhl1 
 
Introduction 
Since European settlement, the continental United States has lost roughly half of 
its wetlands through drainage, conversion and erosion.2  Much of this destruction has 
occurred over the last five decades, with annual losses of almost 60,000 acres of wetlands 
occurring just six years ago.  3 Beyond the aesthetic loss, this has resulted in real 
economic loss. Wetlands provide a range of ecosystem services, from trapping nutrients 
and sediments, water purification and groundwater recharge to flood control and support 
of bird, fish and mammal populations. While not sold in markets, all of these services 
have real value. Often, however, their value is only realized after the wetlands have been 
destroyed − when property owners survey their flooded homes or face a large tax increase 
to pay for a new water plant to treat polluted drinking water. Opinions may differ over 
the value of a wetland’s scenic vista, but they are in universal accord over the 
contributions of clean water and flood control to social welfare. 
While not a high priority issue for most people, the public has long recognized the 
general importance of wetlands. During President George H.W. Bush’s campaign in 
1988, he pledged to ensure there would be “no net loss” of wetlands. President Clinton 
reiterated this commitment in his campaign four years later. In its National Wetlands 
Mitigation Action Plan issued in December, 2002, President George W. Bush’s 
administration stated its commitment to no net loss of wetlands.4  
Despite these continuous presidential pledges to protect wetlands, in recent 
decades, as more and more people have moved to coastal and waterside properties, the 
economic benefits from developing wetlands (and political pressures on obstacles to 
development) have significantly increased. Seeking to mediate the conflict between no 
net loss of wetlands and development pressures, the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) and Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) have employed a range of policy 
                                                          
1  Professor of Law and Environmental Policy, Duke University; Professor, Florida State University 
School of Law.  This article draws from our prior publications in the area, including  James Salzman and 
J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law,  53 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 607 
(2001)  [hereinafter Currencies]; J.B. Ruhl and J. Gregg, Integrating Ecosystem Services Into 
Environmental Law: A Case Study of Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 20  STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
JOURNAL 365 (2001); and James Salzman and J.B. Ruhl, Paying for the protection of watershed services – 
lessons from wetland banking in the USA, in S. Pagiola et al., SELLING FOREST ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES: 
MARKET-BASED MECHANISMS FOR CONSERVATION (2002).  The authors are particularly grateful for the 
comments of Michael Bean, Jim Boyd, Dan Cole, Dick Craswell, Alyson Flournoy, Jody Freeman, Royal 
Gardner, Larry Goulder, Bob Hahn, Oliver Houck, Jason Johnston, Charlie Kolstad, Carol Rose, Mark 
Seidenfeld, Dick Stewart, Dan Tarlock, Buzz Thompson, and Tom Tietenberg.  The empirical research for 
this article was supported by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Science to Achieve Results 
(STAR) program grant R82612-01.  Because this article was not subjected to any EPA review and does not 
necessarily reflect the views of the Agency, no official endorsement should be inferred. 
2  http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/wetlands/vital/status.html 
3  Information on the current status of US wetlands can be found at http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands.  
4  http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/NWMAP122402signed.pdf 
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instruments to slow and reverse wetlands conversion.  Through the 1970s and 1980s, the 
EPA and the Corps relied on prescriptive regulation that discouraged development of 
wetlands and, even if a permit for wetland filling were granted, required on-site 
mitigation of destroyed wetlands to ensure no net loss.  To defuse the growing political 
pressure for substantial change to this “404 Permit” process for developing wetlands, 
however, since the 1990s the agencies and state governments have favored a market 
mechanism that seeks to ensure wetlands conservation at minimum economic and 
political cost.   
This instrument is known as wetlands mitigation banking (WMB).  In WMB, a 
“bank” of wetlands habitat is created, restored, or preserved and then made available to 
developers of wetlands habitat who must “buy” habitat mitigation as a condition of 
government approval for development. This mechanism has also provided a model for 
endangered species protection and is in the process of being extended to other settings 
including watershed protection.  
Given the shift in emphasis from prescriptive regulation to trading, the 
government’s longstanding pursuit of no net loss of wetlands provides a particularly 
useful case study for this workshop.  First, WMB provides a rare example of robust 
trading outside the air pollution context.  As we shall see, trading habitat-based goods 
raises very different concerns than seen in trading mobile pollutants.  Moreover, the 
history of wetlands protection shows an evolution from on-site mitigation to banking and 
offsite mitigation.  In many respects, on-site mitigation represented a form of prescriptive 
regulation while banking introduces a market mechanism.  Thus one can compare the 
application of different types of policy instruments in the same setting.   
Second, examining WMB forces us to think carefully over how to assess the 
“success” of a trading program.  The traditional measure would likely be efficiency.  But 
one must also consider effectiveness.  In this regards, WMB poses two different types of 
failures – failure of instrument design (a “front-end” problem) and failure of 
implementation through monitoring and enforcement (a “back-end” problem).  As many 
of the case studies in this book illustrate, performance of WMB depends critically both 
on institutional design and implementation.  Another important measure of success 
concerns distributional equity.  Who wins and who loses from banking?  Such concerns 
are far more difficult to assess as good or bad policy in habitat trading than the traditional 
“hot spots” of pollutant trading programs.   
The first part of the paper describes the legal and historical background to 
wetlands mitigation banking, identifying the expected advantages, and highlighting the 
practical difficulties. The discussion then focuses on the three main limitations of WMB 
design: ensuring meaningful compliance monitoring, currency adequacy, and exchange 
adequacy. These theoretical concerns are then tested by looking at experiences to date in 
the field.  The paper ends by drawing out key lessons for market-based approaches to 
watershed protection. 
 
Wetlands Compensatory Mitigation 
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The primary law conserving wetlands in the United States is the Clean Water Act 
(CWA), passed in 1972. Section 311 of the CWA broadly prohibits “the discharge of any 
pollutant by any person” into navigable waters, where a pollutant is defined as a discrete 
unit of pollution (e.g., an emission of sulfur dioxide or discharge of toxic waste). On its 
face, this would seem to prevent the filling of most wetlands.5  The CWA provides a 
limited exception to this prohibition in Section 404, which authorizes the Secretary of the 
Army to “issue permits, after notice and opportunity for public hearings for the discharge 
of dredged or fill material into navigable waters at specified disposal sites”.6 These 
permits, administered principally through the Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) and 
known as “404 permits”, “wetland permits”, or “Corps permits”, are the cornerstone of 
federal efforts to encourage protection of wetland resources through market-based means. 
The permitting program, however, suffers many exceptions and nuances. For the 
purposes of this discussion, we note that many routine land development activities 
require and receive 404 permits before they can proceed. Our focus is on how market 
mechanisms have been developed within this framework to promote the conservation of 
wetlands.  
In granting 404 permits, the Corps guidelines call for a “sequencing” approach 
which essentially lists wetland protection actions in the following order of desirability: 
(1) avoid filling wetland resources; (2) minimize adverse impacts to those wetlands that 
cannot reasonably be avoided; and (3) provide compensatory mitigation for those 
unavoidable adverse impacts that remain after all minimization measures have been 
exercised.7  Thus, when applying for a 404 permit, a developer must convince the Corps 
that no reasonable alternatives exist to the development of the wetlands, that the design of 
the development minimizes harm to the wetlands, and, if these two conditions have been 
satisfied, that other wetlands have been restored to compensate for the wetlands 
destroyed (known as “compensatory mitigation”).8  
The EPA and the Corps have traditionally preferred on-site to off-site locations 
for compensatory mitigation activities, and have preferred in-kind mitigation to 
mitigation that uses a substantially different type of wetland.9 As an example, if a mall is 
built on a salt marsh, on-site mitigation would require restoring a wetland on immediately 
adjacent land (versus a distant site) and in-kind mitigation would require restoring a salt 
marsh (versus a fresh water cattail marsh). Finally, regardless of location, the EPA and 
                                                          
5  Although the CWA makes no reference to wetlands with respect to the 404 program, early in the 
program’s history judicial interpretation required the Corps to extend its reach to tidal wetland areas.  See 
Natural Resources Defense Counsel v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975). 
6  The EPA has the power to veto Corps permits if it finds the discharge would have an unacceptably 
adverse effect on environmental resources, but it has exercised this power infrequently.  See S. Burkhalter, 
Oversimplification: Value and Function: Wetland Mitigation Banking, 2 CHAPMAN LAW REVIEW  1 (1999). 
7  See Memorandum of Agreement Between Department of the Army and the Environmental Protection 
Agency Concerning the Clean Water Act Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines, 55 Fed. Reg. 9210, 9211-12 (1990) 
[hereinafter Memorandum of Agreement]. 
8  Section 404 does not mention a mitigation requirement for permit issuance. Rather, this provision of 
the statute directs EPA, in conjunction with the Corps, to develop guidelines that the Corps must apply in 
deciding whether to authorize the fill disposal at a wetlands site. 
9  Ecologists generally divide wetlands into seven major types, within which there is tremendous 
variation from region to region in terms of physical characteristics and functions.  See ENVTL. L. INST., 
WETLAND MITIGATION BANKING 77 [hereinafter ELI-Wetland]  (1993) 
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the Corps favor measures that restore prior wetland areas, followed by enhancement of 
low-quality wetlands and creation of new wetlands. Least-favored of all is the 
preservation of existing wetlands.   
Notwithstanding its official status as the least-favored alternative in the agencies’ 
sequence of preferences, compensatory mitigation proved popular because it freed at least 
some highly valued wetlands for development. Building a shopping center around an 
avoided wetlands site, on choice commercial development land, can present costly design 
constraints. Compensatory mitigation freed up highly valued wetlands for more 
comprehensive and flexible development.  The developer is in the best position to 
evaluate these economic efficiencies and knows when the compensatory land swap is 
superior in comparison to the avoidance strategy.  Compensatory mitigation thus took 
some of the “sting” out of 404 permits and reduced the frequency of incidents when 404 
permitting could be portrayed as unreasonably obstructive.10   
Nonetheless, the on-site and in-kind mitigation requirements remained unpopular 
with developers, who started exerting significant political pressure in the 1980s to loosen 
up or even gut the 404 permitting process.  While compensatory mitigation does share 
some features of an offsets program, if closely following the Corps guidelines there are 
few opportunities for market transactions to arise for the simple reason that mitigation 
should take place on site.  Calls for reform of the 404 program came from 
environmentalists, as well, who decried the practical experience of mitigation projects.   
Indeed, while attractive in theory and providing some political shelter, the project-
by-project compensatory mitigation approach soon became widely regarded as having 
failed miserably in terms of environmental protection.  Whether on-site or near-site, the 
piecemeal approach complicated the Corps’ ability to articulate mitigation performance 
standards, monitor success, and enforce conditions.11  Many developers went through the 
motions of so-called “landscape mitigation”—planting what was required or regrading 
where required to meet the minimum letter of the permit—then moved on, leaving the 
“restored wetland” to revert back to its original habitat, usually a wetland in name only, if 
even that.  For reasons that are still not entirely clear, there was remarkably little 
compliance monitoring of the mitigated sites by the EPA, the Corps, or relevant state 
agencies.  Without the threat of being found out, a wetlands restoration expert bluntly 
noted, it was “easier and cheaper to hire, say, a landscaper who will design and build 
something that looks green and wet . . . than hire a restoration expert.”12 The net result of 
                                                          
10  See Royal C. Gardner, Banking on Entrepreneurs: Wetlands, Mitigation Banking, and Takings, 81 
IOWA L. REV. 527, 586 (1996)  (“The federal retreat from strict sequencing is an attempt to provide 
regulatory relief to small landowners and small businesses.”) [hereinafter Gardner].  One study of 
commercial wetlands mitigation banks concluded that “it is the practice of regulators to relax the first two 
sequencing requirements—avoidance and minimization of wetland impacts—if the wetland that will be 
impacted is of low to mid quality,” thus creating a market for mitigation.  Shirley Jeanne Whitsitt, Wetlands 
Mitigation Banking, 3 ENVTL. LAW. 441, 463-64 (1997). 
11 See Michael S. Rolband, Antoinette L. Pepin, Chris Athanas & Ineke Dickman, Wetlands Banking for 
Sound Mitigation?  Yes, Virginia, NAT. WETLANDS NEWSL., May-June 1999, at 4. 
12 Keith Bowers, What Is Wetlands Mitigation?, LAND DEVELOPMENT, Winter 1993, at 28, 33.  
Lawrence R. Liebesman & David M. Plott, The Emergence of Private Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 13 
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 341 (1998) [hereinafter LIegesman & Plott] (discussing a Florida state agency 
study finding a 27 percent success rate of such projects); Gardner, supra note 10, at 540-42 (discussing the 
Florida study); see also ELI-WETLAND, supra note 9, at 31 (discussing the dismal record of piecemeal on-
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this institutional failure, as Royal Gardner observed, was that “the failure of 
compensatory mitigation is wetland regulation’s dirty little secret.”13   
 
Enter the Market Mechanism 
In light of these problems, the Corps and EPA (supported by many commentators) 
started shifting compensatory activities from on-site to off-site mitigation, thus opening 
the door for greater use of market instruments, in particular, the wetlands mitigation 
banking technique.  This approach, its proponents argued, would prove advantageous 
both in terms of efficiency and ecological benefits, aggregating small wetlands threatened 
by development into larger restored wetlands in a different location.  Defined generally as 
“a system in which the creation, enhancement, restoration, or preservation of wetlands is 
recognized by a regulatory agency as generating compensation credits allowing the future 
development of other wetland sites,”14 wetlands mitigation banking allows a developer 
who has mitigated somewhere else in advance of development to draw from the resulting 
bank of mitigation “credits” as the development is implemented and wetlands are filled.   
When contrasted with the compensatory mitigation experience, the arguments 
presented by EPA and the Corps for WMB in 1990 seemed compelling: 15 
                                                                                                                                                                             
site mitigation projects); CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION, MARYLAND NONTIDAL WETLAND MITIGATION: 
A PROGRESS REPORT 30-39 (1999) [hereinafter Chesapeake Bay Foundation] (discussing independent 
study finding poor record of compensatory mitigation).  It is also worth noting that while compensatory 
wetland mitigation policies relying primarily on wetland creation can result in no net loss of wetlands, they 
are likely to result in overall loss of habitat since the land being converted to wetlands usually is already 
open space.  That is, the net result is less undeveloped land than before.  Compensatory mitigation that 
relies on enhancement or preservation of existing wetlands is likely to produce a net loss of wetlands.  See 
Alyson C. Flournoy, Preserving Dynamic Systems: Wetlands, Ecology, and Law, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL. 
F. 105, 128-29 (1996).  Under any compensatory approach, of course, there is no guarantee that the 
mitigated site would have remained undeveloped indefinitely, but even in this sense the compensatory 
mitigation approach can present a baseline problem.  Wetlands are dynamic systems.  By considering only 
existing wetlands in deciding what should be protected, compensatory mitigation stifles the process of 
wetlands creation (e.g. the hardening of coastal shorelines).  The result is an “invisible loss of wetlands” 
that are not naturally created and will never have the chance to become so.  Interview with Alyson 
Flournoy, Professor, University of Florida School of Law (Apr. 28, 2000). 
13 See, e.g., Michael J. Bean and Lynn E. Dwyer, Mitigation Banking as an Endangered Species Conservation 
Tool, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10537, 10538-9 (2000) [hereinafter Bean & Dwyer] (“The track record of 
traditional, project-by-project wetland mitigation is dismal.”); Gardner, supra note 10, at 540 (“The failure 
of compensatory mitigation is wetland regulation’s dirty little secret.”); Virginia C. Veltman,  Banking on 
the Future of Wetlands Using Federal Law,  89 NW. U.L. REV. 654, 670 (1995) [hereinafter Veltman] 
(“The California State Coastal Conservancy sponsored a review of fifty-eight permits issued for creation 
and restoration projects in the San Francisco Bay Area between 1978 and 1983.  The report found that only 
two of the fifty-eight projects could be deemed successful.”). 
14 See ELI-WETLAND, supra note 9, at 3. 
15 Federal Register, 1990.  Virginia Veltman similarly summarizes the rationales cited for shifting from 
on-site to off-site mitigation locations and from small to large scales of mitigation sites: 
 
[O]ffsite mitigation provides a greater selection of hydrologically and ecologically favorable 
locations, thus increasing the opportunity for a well-functioning replacement. Additionally, offsite 
projects can be joined into one large mitigation, which is beneficial because ‘larger wetland 
systems are generally more self-sustaining.  They can provide habitat for more types of species, a 
longer and more self-sustaining food chain, more habitat niches, and a wider variety of habitat 
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• It may be more advantageous for maintaining the integrity of the aquatic 
ecosystem to consolidate compensatory mitigation into a single large parcel of 
contiguous parcels when ecologically appropriate. 
• Establishment of a mitigation bank can bring together financial resources, 
planning, and scientific expertise not practicable to many project-specific 
compensatory mitigation proposals. This consolidation of resources can increase the 
potential for the establishment and long-term management of successful mitigation 
that maximizes opportunities for contributing to biodiversity and/or watershed 
function. 
• Use of mitigation banks may reduce the time spent on permit processing and 
provide more cost-effective compensatory mitigation opportunities for projects that 
qualify. 
• Compensatory mitigation is typically implemented and functioning in advance of 
project impacts, thereby reducing temporal losses of aquatic functions and 
uncertainty over whether the mitigation will be successful in offsetting project 
impacts. 
• Consolidation of compensatory mitigation within a mitigation bank increases the 
efficiency of limited agency resources in the review and compliance monitoring of 
mitigation projects, and thus improves the reliability of efforts to restore, create or 
enhance wetlands for mitigation purposes. 
• The existence of mitigation banks can contribute towards attainment of the goal 
of no overall net loss of the nation’s wetlands by providing opportunities to 
compensate for authorized impacts when mitigation might not otherwise be 
appropriate or practicable. 
 
To help describe how wetland banking works in practice, a pictorial 
representation is given in Figure 1 below. The developer obtains a permit from the Corps 
to fill 25 hectares of wetlands, and negotiates the permit conditions − in this case, to 
restore 50 hectares elsewhere. Rather than undertaking this restoration work itself, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
types—which, in turn, can better accommodate ecosystem succession, migration, and change.’ 
Thus, the presumption in favor of onsite versus offsite mitigation often encourages, rather than 
prevents, poorly designed wetlands that will either fail or, if viable, provide a nonequivalent 
replacement. 
 
 Veltman, supra note 13, at 673 (citations omitted); see also Michael Rolland, The Systemic 
Assumptions of Wetland Mitigation: A Look at Louisiana’s Proposed Wetland Mitigation and Mitigation 
Banking Regulations, 7 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 497, 510-11 (1994) (noting also that on-site mitigation “puts the 
mitigation for wetlands loss in the hands of a sometimes hostile developer”). 
 Notwithstanding these oft-cited benefits, replacing many small “postage stamp” wetlands with large 
contiguous mitigation projects is not necessarily always a desirable approach, as research indicates that 
some systems of small isolated wetlands provide more biodiversity value than a large contiguous wetland 
of the same type.  In sufficient abundance and proximity, small isolated wetlands provide greater variability 
of conditions, insurance against natural perturbations, and source-sink population dynamics than can a 
contiguous wetland of equal total size.  Moreover, the desirability of either kind of wetland habitat will 
depend on the particular species in mind, thus a policy favoring large contiguous wetlands necessarily 
disadvantages species that depend on systems of small isolated wetlands.  See Raymond D. Semlitsch, Size 
Does Matter: The Value of Small Isolated Wetlands, NAT’L. WETLANDS NEWSL., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 5.   
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however, the developer negotiates to acquire credits for the required 50 hectares from a 
wetland mitigation bank that has been approved by the Corps.  The bank holds the legal 
and financial responsibility to maintain the restored wetlands, not the developer.  In 
simple terms, wetlands mitigation banking can be described as a transaction where, in 
exchange for a payment from the developer, the wetlands mitigation banker informs the 
regulatory agency that a certain number of mitigation acres have been purchased by the 
developer (and which, presumably, are sufficient for the agency to grant the 404 permit to 
the developer).  
 
Figure 1 – Wetland mitigation banking in practice  
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The establishment of Wetlands Mitigation Banks must follow clear federal (and 
increasingly state) guidelines. The Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use and 
Operation of Mitigation Banks (Federal Guidance) articulates a standard review 
procedure for establishing and using wetlands banks in the 404 permit process.16   A 
prospective Bank must submit a prospectus to the Corps. This prospectus is reviewed by 
a Mitigation Bank Review Team that takes account of its compliance with the sequencing 
approach and other preferences applicable to compensatory wetlands mitigation. The 
                                                          
16 See Federal Guidance, Supra note 16.  See generally Gardner, supra note 10, at 563-69.  A 
prospective bank sponsor must submit a prospectus to the Corps. The relevant federal and state agencies, 
known as the Mitigation Bank Review Team, use the prospectus to evaluate the merits of the bank pursuant 
to the sequencing approach and other preferences applicable to compensatory wetlands mitigation in 
general.  The agencies and the bank sponsor then negotiate a banking instrument outlining all the details of 
bank objectives, ownership, operation, and enforcement.  Finally, the proposed bank instrument is 
submitted for public notice and comment before a final bank instrument is implemented. A number of 
states have also provided statutory or regulatory frameworks for using commercial wetlands mitigation 
banks in satisfaction of state wetlands protection laws.  See ELI-WETLAND, supra note 9, at 16-18; 
Gardner, supra note 10, at 569-77. 
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Review Team and Bank then negotiate all the details of Bank objectives, ownership, 
operation, and enforcement before the proposed Bank is submitted for public notice and 
comment. In addition to these federal guidelines, a number of states have provided 
statutory or regulatory frameworks for using wetlands mitigation banks to ensure 
compliance with state wetlands protection laws.  
While there is no uniform bank model, most banks fit either a “single client” or 
“entrepreneur” approach. Under single client models, one developer, whether public (for 
example, a state roads department) or private (for example, a utility company), 
establishes a bank for personal use. The entrepreneur model involves a bank developer 
who intends to sell “credits” to a number of land developers from those building a mall or 
a housing complex to state highway departments building roads. In both cases, the 
banking entity must gain the approval of federal and state regulators.  
With the support of federal agencies, as well as many environmental advocacy 
groups,17 land development interests,18 and academics,19 the wetlands mitigation banking 
program has blossomed since the early 1990s.20 A decade later, wetland mitigation 
banking now resembles a commodity market, with freewheeling, entrepreneurial 
wetlands banks offering for sale (and profit) finished off-site wetlands as “credits” to 
anyone who is in need of mitigation for their 404 permits.21  It is precisely this technique 
that the Corps and EPA officially endorsed in their 1995 Federal Guidance for the 
Establishment, Use and Operation of Mitigation Banks  
In a wide range of fora, its advocates have contended that off-site mitigation 
banking should be preferred over on-site or near-site compensatory mitigation because of 
greater efficiency, scale effects, and environmental protection.22  If these arguments seem 
similar to those advanced on behalf of mainstream environmental trading markets over 
the prescriptive model of regulation, it is no coincidence.  Notwithstanding the substantial 
                                                          
17 See ELI-WETLAND, supra note 9, at 153 (concluding that wetlands mitigation banking can offer 
ecological advantages to on-site mitigation in some instances and “can also provide economies of scale and 
greater regulatory certainty”). 
18 See Liebesman & Plott, supra note 17, at 371 (touting wetlands mitigation banking as “an innovative, 
market-based solution for many of the problems with the existing wetlands regulatory system”). 
19 See Gardner, supra note 10, at 557-62 (advocating the ecological and efficiency benefits of wetlands 
mitigation banking). 
20 Dr. Robert Brumbaugh, manager of the Corps of Engineers’ Institute for Water Research National 
Wetlands Mitigation Banking Study, reports that there were five banks in operation in 1985, 40 in 1992, 
and more than 100 in 1995 with hundreds more in development at that time.  See Robert W. Brumbaugh, 
Wetland Mitigation Banking: Entering a New Era, WETLANDS RES. PROGRAM BULL., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 3 
& fig. 1 (available at <http://www.wes.army.mil/el/wrtc/wrp/bulletins/v5n3/brum.html>) [hereinafter 
Brumbaugh]].  An annual national conference on wetlands mitigation banking, now in its third year of 
production, has sponsors including the Corps, EPA, and a wide variety of private and public entities and 
pitches itself to mitigation bankers, landowners, developers, regulators, local government, suppliers, 
nurseries, engineers, and a host of others interested in banking policy and methods.  See 3rd National 
Mitigation Banking Conference: Learn About Wetlands, Habitat & Conservation Banking (brochure for 
May 17-19 conference, Denver, Colo.). 
21 There are over seventy such commercial mitigation banks operating in the United States today.  See 
Lawrence R. Liebesman and David M. Plott, The Emergence of Private Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 13 
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 341 (1998). 
22 See Federal Guidance, supra note 16, at 58,607.  Banking also avoids the threat of takings claims 
that may arise from exercising the avoid and minimize requirements of sequencing.   
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expense and procedural rigor associated with establishing a commercial wetlands 
mitigation bank, the program, both conceptually and by official endorsement, has all the 
makings of a trading market.  One commentator describes it as “akin to a commercial 
paper transaction: Party A (the credit producer) informs Party B (the regulatory agency) 
that the credits should be released to Party C (the entity with mitigation requirements).”23  
The Corps succinctly describes this feature of commercial wetlands banks as “an implicit 
move away from a rigid, onsite, in-kind preference for piece-meal compensatory 
mitigation towards a broader-based trading system that takes advantage of qualitative 
differences among wetlands and that can use the potential economic profits from the 
development of some low-valued wetlands (that may be doomed in any event).”24   
What do such exchanges look like?  The town of Libertyville, Illinois, for 
example, converted 80 acres of former corn fields into a wetland bank.  A private 
company converted the fields into wetlands for $1.2 million.  For every acre sold to 
developers as a mitigation credit, developers pay about $65,000 and the town gets 
$6,000.25  Nationally, the cost of credits can run from as low as $7,500 in rural areas to 
$100,000 per acre in urban or suburban regions. In theory, the price covers the costs of 
maintaining and monitoring the site to ensure it maintains conditions conducive to 
wetland plant and animal life.26 
The Corps of Engineers tracks the national acreage of permitted wetlands fill and 
mitigation required. From 1993 to 2000, 9,500 hectares of wetlands were filled in 
exchange for 16,500 hectares restored or created in mitigation.27  Despite the rapid 
growth of mitigation banks and their use, though, a number of questions remain. At the 
top of the list we need to ask whether performance has matched expectations. Has 
wetlands mitigation banking led to the conservation of wetlands and “no net loss” of 
wetlands? In what follows, we disentangle the experience of wetlands mitigation banking 
by focusing on whether the trades have exchanged wetlands of equivalent value (an issue 
we call “currency adequacy”) and how the exchanges have been restricted to ensure 
equivalent value (an issue we call “exchange adequacy”). 
 
Currency Adequacy 
In any environmental trading market, whether exchanging sulfur dioxide, halibut, 
chlorofluorocarbons, or wetlands, a fundamental issue is determining the trading metric – 
the “currency”. It is the currency that establishes what is being traded and therefore 
protected. Currencies drive the structure of environmental trading markets, directly 
influencing their construction, rules of exchange, and provision for public participation. 
Whether we can confidently trade “x” for “y” depends on what we are trying to maximize 
                                                          
23 See Royal C. Gardner, Federal Wetland Mitigation Banking Guidance: Missed Opportunities, 26 
Envtl. L.  Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10075, 10075 (1996) [hereinafter Gardner II]. 
24 See Brumbaugh, supra note 22, at 4. 
25 Madhu Krishnamurthy, Wetlands restoration pays off for Libertyville , CHICAGO DAILY HERALD, 
Aug. 14, 2001, at 4. 
26 See Anika Myers, Progress report; As Wetlandsbank enters ninth year, jury of environmentalists still 
out on mitigation efforts, BROWARD DAILY BUSINESS REVIEW, April 19, 2001, at A1. 
27  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES UNDER THE CLEAN WATER 
ACT (2001, National Academy Press) [hereinafter NAS report]. 
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and our standard of measurement, both of which turn on the currency of exchange. Put 
simply, unless the currency captures what we care about, we can end up trading the 
wrong things. 
To ensure equivalent trades of wetlands, the currency must incorporate important 
values provided by both the wetlands to be lost and the wetlands used for mitigation. Of 
course, this begs the questions of what the relevant values are, how we measure them, 
and how we reflect them in a conveniently traded currency.  Put another way, since 1988 
successive presidential administrations have solemnly pledged to ensure no net loss of 
wetlands, but what does that mean?  No net loss of what?  If all that concerns us about 
wetlands protection is acreage, then the job is simple − identify acres of wetlands lost and 
restored and count up the net gain or loss in area. But is that really why we care about 
wetlands?  Isn’t it more likely that we care about wetlands, at least in large part, because 
of their functional value to the environment and the economy?  If so, then counting acres 
may make for easy accounting but poor policy.  Not all wetlands are created equal. 
Context matters.  Wetlands differ by type, location, and the services they deliver. If one 
cares about the ability of wetlands to provide flood control, water quality, and to act as a 
nursery for fish and wildlife, then acres are a terrible currency because they cannot 
capture these service values.  They necessarily remain absent to the transaction and 
become uncaptured externalities.  In other words, unless currencies can capture some 
meaningful measure of service provision, wetlands become increasingly nonfungible 
commodities when their ecosystem values are considered. 
To express this in a simple example, let’s consider the ideal case of trading, where 
the objects exchanged are completely fungible and all variance across space, type, and 
time is eliminated.  Here, trades of homogeneous commodities simultaneously take place 
in a small, discrete location—small blue marbles traded at the same time across a kitchen 
table.  If we are trading identical blue marbles, the number of marbles may serve as a 
perfectly adequate metric (five marbles for five marbles).  If we are trading blue and 
yellow marbles, the number and color of marbles are adequate currencies (three yellow 
marbles for four blue marbles).  If, however, some marbles are highly radioactive and 
others are not, the simple currency metrics of color and quantity fail to capture an 
important variable.28  If the currency cannot incorporate the environmental values we 
care about, these become external to the exchange and, as a result, trades may actually 
worsen the environment or natural services delivered.  Inadequate currencies allow 
externalities to bleed out of the trading market.  We may end up with a nice pile of 
marbles that glow in the dark.29  In the extreme case, the currency can actually encourage 
                                                          
28 To take another example, knowing that one car costs $20,000 and another costs $80,000 tells me a 
great deal about the cars and that consumers value one more than the other; but if I need to buy a car that 
can haul a trailer the currency of dollars is inadequate.  It fails to capture an important value and express it.  
Or, to introduce a market dynamic, assume that apple trees in an orchard produce two types of apples, 
pretty and ugly, but that both taste the same.  Farmers currently sell apples by the bushel.  A supermarket 
will pay a higher price per bushel than a canning factory but only wants to buy pretty apples.  In this case, 
there is a market incentive to develop a grading system (a more sophisticated currency) so the values 
important to the supermarket are meaningfully captured and communicated. 
29 In the above example, the currency must capture color, number, and, hopefully, radioactivity.  Note, 
however, that a similar result may occur even if the currency does capture radioactivity.  This will happen 
if the parties are indifferent to this value.  In such a case the disjunction between between private and 
public interests in trading can result in a loss of social welfare. 
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environmentally harmful behavior.30 
This problem is not unique to WMB.  Indeed, the problem of currency adequacy 
is present in all environmental trading markets.  As the table below sets out, 
nonfungibilities can arise across three dimensions—space, type, and time—in a number 
of settings and, depending on the market, an effective currency may need to capture all 
three.   
 
 
Environmental Trading 
Market 
Nonfungibility of 
Space 
 
Nonfungibility of 
Type 
Nonfungibility of 
Time 
California Rule 1610: 
Program allows trading of 
reduced vehicle volatile 
organic emissions for 
increased refinery volatile 
organic emissions 
emissions 
 
Vehicle emissions are 
geographically  diffused 
versus “hot spot” of  
concentrated refinery 
emissions 
Vehicle emissions may 
be less carcinogenic 
than refinery emissions 
Vehicle emissions 
fluctuate in regular 
patterns over 24-hour 
periods whereas 
refinery emissions 
experience irregular 
peaks 
Wetlands Mitigation 
Banking:  Corps of 
Engineers permit allows 
destruction of wetlands in 
return for contributing to 
wetlands restoration project 
located elsewhere 
 
The lost ecosystem 
services may have been 
delivered to many 
people whereas the  
services of the restored 
wetlands may be 
delivered to few 
The destroyed 
wetlands may have had 
a higher capacity of 
service provision 
compared to the 
restored wetlands 
The permit may allow 
destruction of the 
wetlands before the 
quality of the 
restoration of other 
wetlands is known 
Habitat Conservation 
Plans: Fish and Wildlife 
Service permit allows 
destruction of endangered 
species habitat in return for 
securing preservation of 
another parcel of the 
habitat located elsewhere 
 
The lost habitat may 
have been part of a 
contiguous habitat 
system for the species, 
whereas the preserved 
habitat may be isolated 
and thus of less overall 
value  
The lost and preserved 
habitats may have 
provided functional 
values to different 
populations of the 
species, and we do not 
know which 
population is more 
important to the 
overall viability of the 
species 
The lost habitat may 
have been of ideal 
vegetative maturity for 
the species, while the 
preserved habitat may 
require time to achieve 
that state 
Acid Rain Program: Emissions from the Negligible potential for The two plants may 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 Choosing the wrong currency increases the chances that environmental protection will suffer, but one 
might argue that serendipity can work both ways on a case-by-case basis and may, on occasion, lead to 
environmental improvements.   
30 [W]ith respect to fishing allowances, a [tradable environmental allowance] may employ a 
relatively simple measure, as would be the case where an individual fishing quota is measured in 
pounds or tons of a particular target fish.  But fishermen know that bigger fish bring more at the market 
than smaller ones, and this can induce them to “high-grade,” keeping the bigger fish and simply 
discarding the smaller (and now dead) specimens, with potentially disastrous effects on the fish 
population as a whole. . . . [T]he quest for simplicity in [tradable environmental allowances] has 
feedback effects on what actually gets preserved.   
Carol Rose, Expanding the Choices for the Global Commons: Comparing Newfangled Tradable Allowance 
Schemes to Old-fashioned Common Property Regimes, 10 DUKE ENVTL L. AND POLICY FORUM 45, 60 
(1999). 
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Market for SO2 emissions 
allows power plant to 
exceed allowed emissions 
by purchasing credits from 
other power plants that 
emit less than their 
allowance 
plant purchasing credits 
may be blowing over 
eastern states, whereas 
emissions from the 
plant selling credits 
may have been blowing 
over the ocean 
differences 
 
have different peak 
emissions periods if, for 
example, one is located 
in a cold climate 
(winter peak) and the 
other in a hot climate 
(summer peak) 
 
Alaska Halibut 
Individual Transferable 
Quotas:  
Permits to catch Alaska 
Halibut are traded among 
fishers to avoid derby 
pressures in fishery 
 
One fisher may catch in 
halibut breeding area, 
while other may catch 
fish in non-breeding 
zones  
Tons of halibut does 
not account for 
bycatch, highgrading 
or size of fish (juvenile 
instead of mature) 
One fisher may catch 
halibut during breeding 
season,  while other 
catches out of breeding 
season 
 
As the chart demonstrates, one can easily see how mitigation banking would 
encompass trades between nonfungible wetlands.  Different types of wetlands may be 
exchanged for one another; wetlands in different watersheds might be exchanged; and 
wetlands might be lost and restored in different time frames.  As the potential range of 
variables we care about increases, the need for a refined currency becomes acute.  More 
particularly, when the currency cannot accurately capture the important values (e.g., the 
habitat service, the flood control service, the water filtration service) we have less reason 
to be confident in the equivalency of trades.  Thus, assessing the success of WMB must 
start with an examination of the wetland assessment methodology used by banks and the 
government.31 
To be meaningful, we argue, wetland assessment methodologies must be able to 
capture the provision of valuable services for both the wetlands to be lost and the 
wetlands used for mitigation. One might try to compensate for margins of error in 
estimating service provision values through using simple trading ratios. Thus, for 
instance, where the Corps is uncertain over the true range of functions it might require 
that two or three times as much wetlands area be restored as destroyed.  This approach 
works well if our goal is no net loss of wetlands acreage, but fails to address 
meaningfully the conservation of wetlands services.  Thus, for example, the loss from 
filling a wetlands that provides a valuable service of flood control upstream of a 
community cannot be meaningfully compensated by restoring twice as much wetlands 
that provides little flood control or, taking into account landscape context, the provides 
flood control downstream of the town. 
To the extent that reliable measurements of function value can be made within a 
landscape, wetlands mitigation banking offers a flexible mechanism for achieving 
wetland protection goals at minimum cost. In practice, however, reviews of assessment 
methodology suggest that explicit measures of service values remain beyond the reach of 
virtually all assessment methods in use.  
                                                          
31 Wetland function assessment methods “attempt to establish, in either a qualitative or quantitative 
fashion, the nature and extent of different services which a wetland may provide.  Once those services are 
known, they may be translated into a ‘currency’ which can serve as the medium of trade for a wetland 
mitigation bank.”  ELI-WETLAND, supra note 9, at 77. 
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The Corps has granted broad discretion to state and local authorities to select 
currencies.32 Roughly forty different wetlands assessment methods have been developed, 
varying in terms of the type of habitats in which the method is used, the basic targets of 
assessment, and the functional and social values encompassed in the assessment.33  Over 
half of the methods go beyond assessment of habitat suitability to encompass some 
assessment of wetland function, but many of these function-based methods are bounded 
by limitations on type of habitat for which the method can be used (e.g., coastal wetlands 
only) and limited in terms of the functions assessed (e.g., limited to avian species 
functions).34  Moreover, the data requirements for these advanced methods are 
significant.35   
Reviews of wetland assessment methodology theory and practice conducted since 
banking sprang onto the scene have categorized assessment methods into three major 
types: 
 
• Simple indices are derived from quickly and easily observed characteristics of a 
wetland, and usually serve as surrogate “indicators” of one or more ecological 
functions (for example, percent cover of aquatic vegetation). 
• Narrowly tailored systems attempt to measure directly a limited range of wetland 
services, such as wildlife habitat, through a detailed procedure focusing on that 
particular wetland service (for example, percent duck habitat). 
• Broadly tailored systems examine a range of wetland functions covering a 
number of observable characteristics.36 
 
Simple index methods, such as counting acres, make mitigation banking easier 
and less costly, but “are often the least sensitive to wetlands values and functions.  Also, 
most simple indices do not take into account scale effects.”37  As many of the preceding 
examples have made clear, it would be difficult to integrate ecosystem service valuation 
into wetlands mitigation banking programs relying on simple index methods.  Narrowly 
tailored methods, such as those attempting to evaluate habitat values, are generally 
focused on specific habitat types or species and represent an improvement over counting 
acreage, but still do not directly measure service provision.  Moreover, they can result in 
“mitigating to the test”—that is, driving the banking process toward the favored habitat 
type or species.  “Comparing cumulative [habitat units] for different sets of species 
involves risks inherent in comparing apples and oranges.”38  In other words, the narrowly 
                                                          
32 “Because wetlands are complex and incompletely understood, it is difficult to assign a quantitative 
number to their value.  Instead of confronting this difficulty head-on, the Corps-EPA Mitigation MOA 
provides broad guidelines for valuing wetlands, leaving local permitting authorities with virtually 
unfettered discretion in determining whether a just compensation for destroyed wetlands has been 
achieved.”  Veltman, supra note 13, at 673-74. 
33 See CANDY C. BARTOLDUS, A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF WETLAND ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES: A 
GUIDE FOR WETLAND PRACTITIONERS (1999). 
34 Id. at tbls. 1-3. 
35 Id. at tbl. 3. 
36 ELI-WETLAND, supra note 9, at 78. 
37 Id. at 89. 
38 Id. at 90.  For example, if we measure habitat value based on what makes good habitat for ducks, 
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tailored methods fail to produce a currency that can be reliably used across nonfungible 
features of assessment, suggesting that these methods will not successfully integrate all 
the value measurements needed if the goal is to produce a currency applicable across 
nonfungible biological, economic, and social factors.  Thus, the Environmental Law 
Institute (ELI) concludes, “[f]or wetland managers concerned about the spectrum of 
functions provided by a wetland, there is no substitute for a carefully considered, broadly 
tailored analysis.”39 
In practice, however, these broader assessment methods tend to be expensive and 
to produce reams of qualitative results which, for ease of comparison, wetlands managers 
tend to reduce to quantitative value scores that often mask the ecological rationales.40  
Indeed, comprehensive reviews in 1992 and 1993 of wetlands mitigation banks in 
operation concluded that only a small number employed a broadly tailored method (a 
complex currency), while among the rest “debiting and crediting transactions are based 
on two basic currencies—acreage and functional replacement.”41  To determine whether 
banks established after these studies have adopted more complex currencies, we 
contacted new banks by telephone and e-mail.42  We identified and were able to describe 
in detail thirty-six banks established after 1994.43   
Overall, we found that wetlands assessment methods used by wetlands mitigation 
banks have advanced very little from the beginning of the banking program and simple 
currency methods continue to dominate.44  Wetlands mitigation banking entities seem 
                                                                                                                                                                             
which for a variety of institutional reasons many of the habitat-based indices use as the benchmark, we will 
wind up with more duck habitat and less habitat for species that do not thrive in duck habitat.  See id.  at 36. 
39 Id. at 90. 
40 Id. at 91. 
41 Writing in 1994, ELI found four banks used the Wetland Evaluation Technique (WET), a broadly 
tailored method, and the rest were split between using acre counts (a simple index) and the Habitat 
Evaluation Procedure (HEP) (a narrowly tailored method).  See ELI-WETLANDS, supra note, at app. B.  
Similarly, in its 1994 First Phase Report of the National Wetland Mitigation Study, the Corps’ Institute for 
Water Resources (IWR) reviewed 44 banks existing in 1992.  IWR’s conclusions were consistent with 
those of ELI, finding 12 banks used an inventory method (acres) exclusively, eight used a function 
evaluation method (usually habitat units) exclusively, and the other banks used other methods and 
combinations of methods.  IWR counted none using what ELI would call a broadly tailored index method.  
INSTITUTE FOR WATER RESOURCES, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, NATIONAL WETLANDS MITIGATION 
STUDY: FIRST PHASE REPORT 31-32 (1994) [hereinafter First Phase Report]. 
42 This work was conducted under an EPA STAR grant with Jim Salzman as principal investigator.  See 
Ruhl and Gregg, supra note 1. 
43 Nineteen of these banks use an acre-based index; fifteen use one of the function-based methods, and 
two use a “best professional judgment” approach.  This split between acre-based and function-based 
methods is consistent with ELI’s and IWR’s earlier findings.  See INSTITUTE FOR WATER RESOURCES, 
supra note, at 31-32 (providing pre-1994 data). 
44 Indeed, the Corps has been criticized for being unwilling to engage in broad functional measurement 
in other aspects of the 404 permit program as well, including wetland delineation and permit approval and 
denial.  See Michael J. Mortimer, Irregular Regulation Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: Is the 
Congress or the Army Corps of Engineers to Blame?, 13 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 445, 460-73 (1998) 
(providing an empirical study of Corps actions).  Many state wetland protection programs are accused of 
suffering from the same shortcoming.  For example, Maryland has one of the most sophisticated regulatory 
programs in place for wetlands protection yet it, too, relies on a simple currency.  As a Chesapeake Bay 
Foundation report described, the Maryland Department of the Environment’s method “to calculate the 
amount of mitigation required to compensate for wetland impacts is replacement ratios.  While this method 
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focused on using the simplest and most expedient assessment method that the relevant 
regulatory bodies will approve and, to date, most regulatory bodies do not appear to 
require or even encourage a more sophisticated approach. A comprehensive currency 
seems too expensive to mint and too arduous to use. Thus instead of developing and 
refining valuation approaches for assessment and trades, wetlands mitigation banking 
assessment methods have largely stagnated in the acre-based and narrow function-based 
approaches, resulting in the use of relatively crude currencies for wetlands habitat trading 
purposes. 
 
Exchange Adequacy 
The analytical framework we have proposed in earlier research predicts that crude 
currencies, such as those derived from the simple index measures of wetland qualities 
that prevail in wetlands banking programs, will result in tightly constrained trading 
schemes if the market maker desires to control for environmental externalities.45  By 
contrast, sophisticated wetland assessment methods, such as ones that fully reflect 
wetland function values, can be converted to currencies that limit externalities 
sufficiently to allow the market maker to permit trades to be made regardless of type, 
space, and time differences.  The comprehensive currency, reflecting function and service 
value, would make differences in type irrelevant, allow comparison of impact to different 
locations, and allow discounting for purposes of timing differentials.46  The wetlands 
banking program, hamstrung as it is by its crude currency forms, bears out this postulated 
inverse relationship between currency sophistication and intensity of market constraint.  
The following paragraphs briefly set out how WMB trading rules have sought to squeeze 
out the nonfungibilities of type, space and time. 
 
Nonfungibility of type  
The preference the Corps and EPA demonstrate for in-kind compensatory wetland 
mitigation reflects the substantial differences in rarity, time to maturity, and functions 
that different wetland types exhibit.  Because crude currencies such as acres and habitat 
function fail to capture these complex differences in wetlands, wetlands mitigation 
banking programs also are reluctant to stray far from a strict in-kind policy.  For example, 
the Federal Guidance allows, at least in principle, out-of-kind mitigation in banking only 
“if it is determined to be practicable and environmentally preferable.”47  Even when out-
                                                                                                                                                                             
considers acreage, vegetation, and to a limited extent, uniqueness, it does not specifically consider wetlands 
functions gained or lost.”  CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION, supra note 12, at 10. 
45 See Currencies, supra note 1, at 638. 
46 For example, when Florida recently enacted legislation requiring all state and local agencies engaged 
in wetland mitigation banking to devise and adopt a uniform functional assessment method, see supra note, 
it anticipated the type, space, and time nonfungibilities inherent in the process.  The assessment method 
thus must (1) “account for different ecological communities in different areas of the state”; (2) “determine 
the value of functions provided by wetlands . . . considering . . . location”; and (3) “account for the 
expected time-lag associated with offsetting impacts.”  Fla. H.B. 2365, § 4 (2000) (amending FLA. STAT. § 
373.414(18)).  The Florida Department of Environmental Protection had until January 2002 to devise this 
all-encompassing currency for mitigation banking.  
47 Federal Guidance, supra note 16, at 58,611. 
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of-kind trading is allowed, however, banks typically impose fixed trading ratios between 
acres of the wetland types as a surrogate for more precise measurements of comparative 
function value.48  In short, as compared to open or fixed ratio out-of-kind trading, “[i]n-
kind mitigation requires less understanding of tradeoffs because it is based on the 
assumption that certain wetland functions . . . will follow the wetland form.”49  The cost 
of this in-kind requirement, however, is a thinning of the wetlands trading market from 
all wetlands to only the defined in-kind type. 
 
Nonfungibility of space 
The value of wetlands’ services depends fundamentally on their landscape 
context.50  Even controlling for type, a bog wetland in Maine may not provide the same 
function values as one in Oregon, or even one in the next county.  And even if it does, it 
certainly will not deliver the services of nutrient trapping, flood control, or nursery 
habitat to the same parties.  Obviously, however, the preference for on-site mitigation the 
Corps and EPA have adopted for compensatory mitigation in general cannot apply 
strictly to wetland mitigation banking.  Instead, the concept of a geographically defined 
“service area” is imposed on wetlands banks to define the area “wherein a bank can 
reasonably be expected to provide appropriate compensation for impacts to wetlands 
and/or other aquatic resources.”51  In general, service areas should be no larger than the 
watershed within which the bank is located, unless reaching beyond that market is 
“practicable and environmentally desirable.”52  Coupled with an in-kind constraint, this 
service area constraint should further narrow the potential supply of wetlands in the 
trading market.53 
 
Nonfungibility of time  
One of the purported advantages of wetland banking programs is that the bank has 
created the wetlands before the credits are drawn, so that the mitigation is secured before 
the wetlands are filled.  In general, therefore, the Federal Guidance provides that “[t]he 
number of credits available for withdrawal (i.e., debiting) should generally be 
commensurate with the level of aquatic functions attained at a bank at the time of 
                                                          
48 See ELI-WETLAND, supra note 9, at 92.  Trading ratios also are often imposed to adjust for different 
mitigation forms (e.g., restoration versus preservation) and for the general uncertainty that the bank 
wetlands will exhibit as much acre-for-acre integrity as the filled wetlands.  See id. 
49 Id. at 30. 
50 See James Salzman, Valuing Nature’s Services, 24 ECOLOGY L. QUART. 887, 896 (1997) (“The value 
of a wetland’s nutrient trapping services, for instance, depends on the location of its out-flow.  Does it flow 
to shellfish beds (high value) or a fast-flowing ocean current (low value)?”).  In our EPA grant, we studied 
a trade in Florida of inland wetlands for wetlands located on a small island in a river.  Even if the two 
wetlands have the same biophysical capacity, the delivery, and therefore value, of their services will differ 
significantly.  See also ELI-WETLAND, supra note, at 30 (“[M]ost wetland functions have value because of 
where they exist in the landscape.”). 
51 Federal Guidance, supra note 14, at 58,611. 
52 Id. 
53 The spatial fungibility issue is even more complicated in the endangered species context, where 
strategic siting of bank service areas must account for species movement, habitat succession, and 
discontinuities in suitable habitat locations.  See Bean & Dwyer, supra note 13, at 10,537. 
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debiting.”54  With large commercial banks, however, the expense and time involved with 
establishing functional wetlands, particularly those of types that require long maturation 
periods, could make the banking cost prohibitive if credits could not be drawn before the 
bank’s wetland values are fully in place.  The Federal Guidance thus allows some leeway 
in the timing requirement, allowing credit withdrawal before equal wetland values are 
established, if the bank possesses adequate financial assurance and has exhibited a high 
probability of success.55  In some cases this policy results in lags of up to six years between 
the times of wetland destruction and wetland replacement.56 
 
How Well Does Mitigation Banking Work? 
The Process 
Our findings and those of others suggest that practical constraints on the 
implementation of more sophisticated assessment methods designed to produce a refined 
currency for trades—in terms of costs, time demands, and complexity—have prevented 
wetland mitigation banking from ensuring currency adequacy.  Thus, wetlands banking 
has been forced into the next best alternative—designing market constraints to plug up 
the holes that the crude currency otherwise leaves open to externalities.  Assessment 
methodology has become the proverbial tail that wags the dog, keeping the wetlands 
program from tapping the full benefit of market trading efficiency as the market makers 
(EPA and the Corps) attempt to shore up the weak currency with market constraints. 
                                                          
54 Federal Guidance, supra note 16, at 58,611.  Studies of wetland restorations have found a remarkably 
low rate of success.  The Florida Department of Environmental Regulation found a success rate of forty-
five percent for tidal wetlands creation, twelve percent for freshwater wetlands creation.  Veltman, supra 
note 13, at 669. 
55 See Federal Guidance, supra note 16, at 58,611.  Explaining the pressure to relax time restraints, a 
Corps official has written: 
Among the most critical issues that affect the financial success of commercial banks, and thus 
the willingness on the part of the private sector to get involved in commercial banking, is the 
timing of debiting versus accrual of credits in the bank.  Ideally, mitigation banks are 
constructed in advance of development projects that result in wetland losses and are seen as a 
way of reducing uncertainty in the wetlands replacement process.  However, virtually all 
private commercial bank entrepreneurs argue that for their banking ventures to be 
economically viable, they need to be allowed to sell credits before replacement wetlands are 
fully functioning or self-maintaining.  Allowing a bank to be debited before it achieves a fully 
functioning stage involves a trade-off between ecologic and economic risks. The later the 
bank may be debited (along a time continuum from planning through design, construction, 
and operation), the lower the ecologic risk.  However, delays in allowing debiting increase the 
financial risk to the investor. The private sector generally needs some level of immediate 
return to justify the financial risk or to supplement initial funding. . . .  Private commercial 
banks implemented to date reflect the value of time.  Regulators have allowed debiting 
(generally to a limited extent) shortly after bank construction, during construction, or even 
shortly before construction, if there was an approved site plan and appropriate real estate 
arrangements and financial assurances (such as funds for remedial work, if needed, and for 
long-term management).” 
Brumbaugh, supra note 22, at 4-5. 
56 See Michael G. Le Desma, A Sound of Thunder: Problems and Prospects in Wetland Mitigation 
Banking, 19 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 497, 506 (1994). 
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There is good reason to believe this problem will be endemic to habitat trading 
programs in general until ecologists can deliver a cheaply calculated, refined currency for 
habitat values.57  The cost of valuing the currency in the sulfur dioxide program is low—a 
ton is a ton.  But the cost of creating habitat currencies is either very cheap—an acre is an 
acre—or, if we demand reliable measures of environmental and social service values, 
very expensive.   
It is important to recognize that WMB trading programs differ in another 
fundamental way from typical markets, as well.  Assume, for example, that Charlie sells a 
bike to Jody.  Jody has every reason to ensure that the bike works well and will hold up 
for her rides around town.  This transaction has a built-in quality check.  Jody does not 
want to buy a lousy bike.  The WMB program, however, does not work in a similar 
manner, for quality is not valued.  Indeed, the developer has virtually no interest in the 
quality of the wetlands being restored.  He simply wants a permit from the Corps.  
Similarly, the banker doesn’t care about the quality of the wetlands, either.  She simply 
wants the Corps to sign off so she can sell credits.  She is supposed to maintain restored 
wetlands after the credits have been sold, of course, but will likely only do so if 
compliance monitoring and enforcement by the Corps are likely.  Thus in all key 
respects, the central player in all this is the Corps.  There is no invisible hand at work here.  It 
falls on this agency, which is not a market participant, to ensure the quality of the restored 
wetlands because neither the buyer nor seller have an incentive to do so.   
Developers and bankers have an obvious profit incentive to use the least 
expensive currency the government will allow.  But the government needs to be careful 
in demanding wetlands quality and equivalence of trades.  It has an incentive not to make 
the currency too expensive to mint, or no one will use it and the trading program will 
expire of its own accord.  Because of these agency and participant incentives, the net 
result has been Gresham’s Law in practice – simple currencies have driven out complex 
ones.   
Despite policies mandating that habitat trading ensure equivalent value and 
function,58 the experience is that most programs are not administered this way.  In 
practice, most habitat trades to date in wetlands programs have been approved on the 
basis of acres, in many instances ensuring equivalence in neither value nor function.  If 
parties have a choice between a complex (and expensive) currency that measures 
equivalent function or a simple metric, and both deliver a 404 permit, simplicity will 
always win.  Thus, given the choice in the habitat context of acres or complicated 
measures of value, acreage has won.   
Moreover, now that the Corps has committed to the mitigation banking program 
as the ideal of compensatory mitigation, many believe that there is pressure within the 
Corps to facilitate the program by easing the official avoid-minimize-compensate 
                                                          
57  I just returned from a year in Australia on a Fulbright studying ecosystem service markets for 
biodiversity, water quality and salinity.  In every single market, the assessment methodology for use in the 
field to score specific land parcels was absolutely critical to the success of the market mechanism.  
58 See Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 7, at 9212 (Wetland values shall be determined “by 
applying aquatic site assessment techniques generally recognized by experts in the field and/or the best 
professional judgment of Federal and State agency representatives, provided such assessments fully 
consider ecological functions included in the Guidelines.”) (emphasis added). 
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sequencing policy that has already eroded substantially.59  Avoiding wetlands and 
minimizing wetland impacts reduce the demand for mitigation bank credits and thus thin 
the market.  Predictably, the pressures to adopt crude currencies and to keep markets 
thick combine to allow the seepage of externalities from the wetlands mitigation banking 
market.60  
One way to get around this problem might be to “subcontract” the oversight role 
to a party that has an institutional concern over wetlands quality – perhaps a group such 
as Ducks Unlimited or The Nature Conservancy.  These organizations could play the role 
of approving wetlands banks and determining the ratio of filled to restored wetlands.  
Beyond public accountability, The obvious downside to such an approach is that 
conservation organizations can have their own narrow interests (most notable in the case 
of Ducks Unlimited and protecting wetlands for waterfowl hunting). 
Given this state of affairs, the aggressive integration of open trading models into 
wetlands and other habitat contexts poses concerns for environmental protection.  Even 
the most developed habitat assessment methods presently in use are ill-prepared to 
produce reliable, inexpensive, and ready measurements of a habitat’s environmental and 
service values.  Such measurements require far more money and time to produce on a 
site-specific basis than developers, habitat bankers, and the government seem prepared to 
allocate.  In the absence of such measurements, the government and environmental 
groups will likely require at a minimum constraints on habitat trading markets (i.e., 
stronger exchange adequacy). 
But even the current trading constraints are seen by many as too restrictive.  
Observers have criticized the Federal Guidance for adhering too strictly to the 
sequencing approach and other conditions applied generally to compensatory mitigation, 
arguing that “this policy could prevent a banking market from ever emerging.”61  This is 
the inevitable pressure any regulated market faces when externalities must be controlled 
through market constrictions rather than through a refined currency—at some point the 
constraints threaten to swallow the market.  Surely a loosening of type, space, and time 
constraints would make banking more flexible and economically attractive to 
entrepreneurs, but at what price to the environment? 
                                                          
59 See Bean & Dwyer, supra note 13, at 10,550 (“[C]onservation interests worry that the practical effect 
of the mitigation banks is to tempt regulators to skip rather lightly past avoidance and minimization and 
proceed instead directly to compensation in the form of purchasing credits from a bank.”). 
60  In another article (Currencies, supra note 1), we argue that this state of affairs suggests the need for a 
third layer of analysis – “Review adequacy” to ensure that trades really do promote the public welfare.  
Such an approach, however, will surely raise transaction costs, undercutting the efficiency benefits of 
environmental markets.  At the workshop, Jason Johnston suggested a way around this problem by having 
expert third parties take over the role of the Corps.  Thus the Nature Conservancy or some other land trust 
might decide whether trades ensure no net loss of services.  Whether such parties would be regarded by 
developers as neutral or acceptable, however, is an open question.  
61 Liebesman & Plott, supra note 17, at 342; see also Gardner II, supra note 24, at 10,075 (stating that 
the Federal Guidance “does not go far enough to encourage private-sector investment in the process of 
wetland mitigation”); William W. Sapp, The Supply-Side and Demand-Side of Wetlands Mitigation 
Banking, 74 OR. L. REV. 951, 981-90 (1995) (arguing for relaxation of strict sequencing, on-site mitigation 
preference, and in-kind mitigation preference in order to increase the demand for mitigation banking 
credits—i.e., to thicken the market). 
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Indeed, the Federal Guidance invites further pressure to restrict the market with 
its “practicable and environmentally desirable” standard for exceptions to the set of 
trading constraints.  As commercial banking becomes more widespread, it is likely that 
the criticisms bank sponsors have already lodged against the Federal Guidance will 
intensify if the market for credits does not swell.  Moreover, to the extent mitigation 
banking is intended to replace the project-by-project approach to compensatory 
mitigation in the regime of 404 permits, the Corps already feels pressure to ensure that 
the market does not become too thin.  And make no mistake, the Corps is feeling pressure 
to loosen the timing restrictions of the Federal Guidance and other exchange adequacy 
safeguards and has openly discussed relaxation of its restrictions. 
At the extreme, of course, land developers and bank sponsors most prefer a 
nationwide bank of freely transferable credits, and have been pushing for this and 
relaxation of other restraints.62  Such relaxation of space, type, and time restraints may 
seem reasonable if the Corps believes the existing crude wetlands currencies are 
sufficient.  If so, though, it will be banking on sheer serendipity to believe that wetlands 
banking and other habitat trading programs will produce consistently positive results for 
the environment. 
   
How to Measure Success? 
The preceding analysis has focused on the problems inherent in creating a 
wetlands market for nonfungible goods and services.  But have these theoretical concerns 
been borne out in practice?  There are three useful ways to measure success – efficiency, 
distributional equity, and effectiveness.   
Despite all its potential shortcomings, WMB certainly remains popular.  Credits 
in Florida are now trading anywhere from $30,000-$80,000 per acre.  There clearly is 
demand and banks are still being created to supply it.  The program seems efficient, in 
that calls for gutting the 404 program have fallen off the political landscape while 
wetlands protection and development both continue at costs that appear acceptable to the 
parties.  But this is only one, and arguably deceptive, measure of success. 
If one looks at distributional equity – market-driven ‘migration’ of wetlands 
across the urban-rural landscape – the case is less clear.  As noted earlier, landscape 
context matters.  Even if a restored wetlands provides the same biophysical level of 
services as the filled wetland, the services may have little or no value if they are not 
delivered to a population that needs them.  This is an issue of distributional equity – who 
is winning and who is losing through WMB trades?  A study of wetland banking in 
Florida, for example, found that trades, even in the same watershed, have produced “a 
transfer of wetlands from highly urbanized, high-population density areas to more rural 
low-population density areas.”63  The same problem has plagued mitigation banking in 
Virginia, where a study found that most mitigation banks are located in rural areas while 
                                                          
62 See ELI-WETLAND, supra note 9, at 58. 
63 Dennis King and L. W. Herbert, The Fungibility of Wetlands, 19 NATIONAL WETLANDS NEWSLETTER 
10, 11 (1997). 
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most wetland losses take place in urban and suburban areas.64  In other words, as can be 
expected from a market efficiency perspective, developers want to develop wetlands 
where land is dear (urban) and wetland banks want to locate where land is cheap (rural).  
The result is trades that move wetlands out of areas where they may provide valuable 
services to urban populations and into sparsely populated areas where, most likely, their 
service provision is either redundant or less valuable.  The existing wetlands mitigation 
banking framework lets this happen, or at least fails to scrutinize the externality effects of 
the practice.   
Should we be concerned about this market-driven shift of wetlands from urban to 
rural areas, even if it simply reflects the efficiency of trading?  If we care about the equity 
of who receives wetland services and their value, then the answer is yes, and we should 
closely examine the redistribution of wetland service values within the environment and 
between human populations.65  Are there identifiable groups that would be harmed by 
conversion in one area and not compensated by mitigation in another? And if so, how 
severe is that damage, and what mechanisms might be put in place to compensate these 
losers?  If we care primarily about keeping the wetland banking market thick or no net 
loss of wetland acreage, however, then maybe we shouldn’t be overly concerned, for to 
add another location restriction based on keeping trades within the same “population-
shed” would surely thin the market. 
And what can we say about whether WMB is effectively meeting the overarching 
goal of no net loss?  Despite its role as the central justification for wetlands policy, there 
are surprisingly few detailed data available on WMB trades. While a number of case 
studies in the literature provide trade-specific data on the size of mitigated areas, few 
disclose price or functional details. Indeed we have come across no studies that closely 
track trends in regional or local volume of trading over time (either number of trades or 
land area), the prices of mitigation credits, or the costs of establishing and operating 
banks. Reflecting this dearth of data, the most comprehensive study on mitigation 
banking to date, a 2001 report by the National Academy of Sciences, recommended the 
creation of a national database to track the loss and restoration of wetlands function over 
time.66  Any overall conclusions on the WMB experience are hampered by this lack of 
data and the Bush Administration has responded in its National Wetlands Action Plan of 
2002 by pledging to establish a comprehensive mitigation database and annual public 
report card on wetlands programs by 2005. 
                                                          
64 See Ann Jennings, Roy Hoagland & Eric Rudolph, Down Sides to Virginia Mitigation Banking, 
NAT’L WETLANDS NEWSL., Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 9, 10.  The Virginia study also found an increasing trend 
toward the use of banks in one watershed to compensate for losses in a different watershed.  See id. at 9-10. 
65 We are not suggesting that the shift from urban to rural wetlands is necessarily an unwise policy in all 
cases.  In some settings, the urban wetlands to be developed may be comprised of many small, isolated 
wetlands of poor quality, whereas the rural mitigation bank may produce a large, contiguous, high-quality 
habitat.  We are suggesting, however, that the shift between the human populations serviced may be 
significant and thus should be considered in the evaluation of the mitigation banking policy, whereas the 
Florida and Virginia studies show that it has not been.  Moreover, research has revealed the importance of 
small, isolated wetlands to maintaining biodiversity and habitat for some species, thus the ideal of large, 
contiguous rural wetlands will not always provide superior environmental value.   
66  See NAS Report, supra note 28. 
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 If one looks at acreage, the overall results of the nation’s wetlands protection 
programs appear positive.  According to the National Wetlands Inventory, conducted 
every ten years by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the rate of wetlands loss from 
1985-1995 was 0.11% per year.67  The National Resources Inventory, conducted by the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture and employing a different sampling method, reached a 
roughly similar conclusion, finding a net wetlands loss of 0.07% per year from 1982-
1992.68  These are almost a quarter lower than rates of loss from the preceding decade.69  
WMB has contributed to this trend.  The Corps estimates that from 1993-2000, roughly 
24,000 acres of wetlands were permitted to be filled and 42,000 were required as 
compensatory mitigation, a gain of 1.8 acres for every acre developed.70     
If one looks at service provision, though, the data suggest WMB has not 
performed well.  For example, despite claims by the Maryland Department of the 
Environment that the state had gained 122 acres of wetlands between 1991 and 1996, a 
Chesapeake Bay Foundation study found that there had been a net loss of fifty-one acres 
of wetlands functions.71  In the most comprehensive study to date on this issue, in 2001 
the National Academy of Sciences examined the practice of wetlands compensatory 
mitigation.  The very first of the Committee’s Principal Findings was that “the goal of no 
net loss of wetlands is not being met for wetland functions by the mitigation program.”72  
In response to this report, the Bush Administration has gone even farther, acknowledging 
in its recent Wetlands Mitigation Action Plan that,  
 
As a general matter, compensatory mitigation decisions are made on a case-by-case basis 
and often do not consider the proper placement of mitigation projects within the 
landscape context, the ecological needs of the watershed, and the cumulative effects of 
past impacts…  EPA has identified improving wetlands ecological performance and 
results of compensatory mitigation as a priority.73  
 
Given the reliance on crude currencies and loose exchange restrictions, such a 
conclusion is hardly surprising.  To its credit, the Bush Administration has pledged in its 
Action Plan to implement most of the NAS Committee’s recommendations.  Given the 
trade-offs between thick markets, on the one hand, and refined currencies and tight 
trading restrictions, on the other, however, we remain cautious over whether the promised 
reforms (assuming they are implemented) will produce significantly different results on 
the ground. 
                                                          
67  David Sounding and David Zilberman, The Economics of Environmental Regulation by Licensing: An 
Assessment of Recent Changes to the Wetland Permitting Process, 42 NATURAL RES. J. 59, 71 (2002). 
68  Ibid. 
69  The largest single category of wetland loss is that of agricultural and silvicultural activities, neither of 
which are subject to the compensatory mitigation procedures described above.   
70  It is worth noting that the National Academy of Sciences study did not trust the mitigation data, 
saying they were inadequate to determine the status of compensated wetlands.  NAS Report, supra note 28,  
at 3.  It is also worth noting that, when compared to the overall estimate of 58,545 acres lost per year, then 
the contribution of WMB is minor. 
71  See CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION, supra note 12, at i. 
72  NAS Report, supra note 28, at 2. 
73  EPA, NATIONAL WETLANDS ACTION PLAN   4 (Dec. 24, 2002). 
 22
 23
 
Conclusion:  Lessons for Habitat Market-Based Instruments  
Environmental trading markets remain popular and are growing. Mature 
environmental trading markets are active in reducing air pollution, regulating land 
development, and are under serious consideration for endangered species habitat. It is 
easy to imagine the use of such a mechanism in forestry, where a particular land use is 
valued for its watershed protection services. 
In asking whether mitigation banking has been successful, one must look beyond 
market volume and consider what success means, and in comparison to what alternative. 
As described above, focusing on the identification of trading currencies forces policy 
makers to articulate what the goal of the market-based mechanism should be.  If the goal 
is no net loss of wetland acreage, then acres are a fine currency.  If the goal is no net loss 
of wetlands function and delivery of services, then the current reliance on acreage metrics 
will likely to continue to fail.   
In comparing on-site versus off-site mitigation (which in this context serve as 
rough proxies for prescriptive regulation versus a market-based approach) one must 
assess whether the gains from the mitigation areas are sufficient to offset the losses in the 
conversion area. This must be done both from the view of distributional equity, overall 
loss of service provision, and overall value of service provision.   
To be sure, creating an environmental market by no means ensures environmental 
protection. Beyond design issues such as creation of stable property rights lies the equally 
critical issue of implementation.  In retrospect, the greatest failing of on-site mitigation 
may well not have been its prescriptive approach but, rather, the virtually nonexistent 
monitoring and enforcement of the mitigation projects.  This was an institutional, not an 
instrument design, failure.  As a result, one cannot draw a conclusion from the wetlands 
case over whether prescriptive regulation or market instruments was more effective.  Had 
on-site mitigation actually been monitored and enforced, perhaps services would not only 
have been conserved but continue to be delivered to the same populations as before.  We 
just don’t know. 
More generally, as this chapter has pointed out, WMB programs are particularly 
vulnerable to implementation failures because the government, not the market actors, 
must ensure the quality and equivalence of the exchange.  This inherent challenge is no 
different than with the other important habitat trading instrument – habitat conservation 
plans (HCPs) under the Endangered Species Act.  In exchange for taking endangered 
species and adversely modifying part of the species habitat, development interests agree 
to manage (and often restore) other parts of the landscape.  This does not produce credits 
that can be traded, but the similarities to WMB are striking for in both schemes the 
government decides on the equivalency of the exchanges.  In both cases, there is an 
inherent tendency that will lead to a net loss of prime habitat/wetlands over time.  In the 
case of HCPs, this occurs because there is an overall reduction in habitat as a result of the 
permitted development.  In the case of WMB, the reduction occurs not in the form of 
total acreage but, rather, in a likely decrease of valuable service provision. 
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At a basic level, if the currency is unable to capture accurately the value sought to 
be measured (the ecosystem service values), then confidence in the procedural and 
substantive adequacy of the trading system will erode. Developing an assessment 
methodology that measures the ecosystem service value, or some reliable indicator of the 
valued product (e.g., water quality, floodwater retention, etc.), will be the critical first 
step in developing a framework for any trading-based mechanism. The actual shape of 
the trading mechanism for habitat protection will, of course, depend upon the particular 
setting and management goals. If the currency can be easily set, measures of value 
determined cost effectively, and trading restrictions established that still provide a market 
thick with participants, then trading mechanisms will work well. If any of these are 
lacking (as most are in the case of wetlands), then one will have less confidence that the 
trading ensures and promotes environmental protection.   
